Why the Indo-Pacific May No Longer Serve American Interests
Tom Raquer
Lt. Col. (Ret.), USAF • Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer
From the series:
After the Winter — Collapse, Spring, and the New First Turning
Published: March 17, 2026
Preview
For decades, American strategy has assumed that the Indo-Pacific will be the central theatre of the twenty-first century.
But this assumption rests on a premise rarely examined.
It assumes that the United States must indefinitely sustain the global maritime system that enabled globalisation.
Yet in a constitutional republic, strategy ultimately rests on something more fundamental.
The true centre of gravity of a republic is not a region, alliance, or trade route.
It is the citizen.
When foreign commitments weaken domestic cohesion, even the most impressive global posture can become strategically unsound.
Strategic Context
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has sustained an international maritime system. This system is built upon open sea lanes and global commerce.
American naval power guaranteed the movement of goods, energy, and capital across the world’s oceans.
This system enabled globalisation and helped integrate the economies of Europe, Asia, and North America.
It also made the Indo-Pacific the geographic centre of global economic activity.
For decades, American strategy thus treated the region as the decisive theatre of international politics.
But historically, this arrangement was unusual.
For most of history, great powers did not guarantee open trade to other states. They pursued strategies rooted primarily in their own geopolitical interests.
The post-1945 maritime order was thus not a permanent feature of international politics.
It was a strategic choice made possible by American power and American political consensus.
The Clausewitzian Test
The Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously observed:
“War is merely the continuation of policy with other means.”
Strategy, thus, exists to serve a political purpose.
For a constitutional republic, that political purpose ultimately rests upon the cohesion and consent of the citizenry.
This raises a fundamental strategic question:
Does sustaining the global maritime system still serve the American republic itself?
If the answer becomes uncertain, even long-standing strategic commitments deserve reconsideration.
The Citizen as the Centre of Gravity
Clausewitz described the centre of gravity as the source of power that sustains a political entity in conflict.
In authoritarian systems, the centre often lies in the state itself.
But in a constitutional republic, power ultimately flows upward from citizens.
Public legitimacy sustains institutions, military power, and long-term strategy.
The citizen, thus, becomes the true strategic foundation of national power.
Military ability, economic strength, and alliances ultimately depend upon domestic legitimacy and public consent.
When that legitimacy weakens, the state’s strategic capacity inevitably follows suit.
A republic that sacrifices domestic cohesion to sustain external commitments risks undermining the very foundation of its strength.
The Indo-Pacific Assumption
Contemporary strategy debates often assume that the Indo-Pacific will stay the central focus of American strategy for decades.
This assumption rests on several propositions:
- China will stay the primary pacing threat
- Asian economic growth will drive global prosperity
- The United States must guarantee freedom of navigation to sustain global trade
Yet these assumptions may prove less stable than many analysts expect.
Recent disruptions to global energy flows illustrate the fragility of the network on which globalisation depends.
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz clearly demonstrates this vulnerability.
Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply passes through that single maritime chokepoint.
But a deeper question emerges.
Who actually benefits from securing these global trade flows?
The United States now imports only a small percentage of its energy through Hormuz.
Yet American military power remains the primary guarantor of the network.
Testing the Indo-Pacific Assumption
A central premise of contemporary strategy is that the Indo-Pacific shows the natural centre of global economic power.
Yet it is worth asking whether this prominence is entirely organic. Alternatively, has it been sustained in large part by the American maritime system that enabled globalisation?
For decades, U.S. naval power guaranteed open sea lanes, protected energy flows, and stabilised maritime trade across the region. That security environment allowed export-driven economies and complex supply chains to flourish across the Indo-Pacific.
But this raises a deeper strategic question.
If the maritime system that sustains this order were reduced, what would happen? If it were withdrawn, would the Indo-Pacific continue to function as the dominant centre of global economic activity?
Or would regional rivalries, energy insecurity, and geopolitical competition begin to fragment the system that globalisation created?
The true test of any strategic system is whether it continues to operate once the power sustaining it is removed.
The Return of Geopolitics
For several decades, globalisation muted traditional geopolitical competition.
Economic integration created the expectation that trade networks would permanently override geopolitical rivalry.
That assumption now appears increasingly fragile.
Periods of systemic crisis often reverse global integration.
Nations start prioritising security, resilience, and domestic stability over global economic efficiency.
Supply chains shorten.
Trade blocs fragment.
Regional powers increasingly assume responsibility for their own security.
In such an environment, the Indo-Pacific may no longer operate as the singular centre of global economic gravity.
Instead, the world may gradually return to a more traditional geopolitical landscape.
America’s Natural Geopolitical Advantages
Unlike many great powers, the United States occupies one of the most secure geopolitical positions in the world.
Two vast oceans separate it from the major centres of Eurasian conflict.
The country possesses abundant natural resources, a continental-scale economy, and a large internal market capable of sustaining industrial power.
Historically, these advantages allowed the United States to avoid permanent entanglement in Eurasian power struggles.
American strategy traditionally intervened overseas only when a hostile power threatened to dominate the industrial centres of Europe or Asia.
There was no such threat. Because of this, the republic’s geographic position allowed it to stay secure. It avoided the costs of permanent ongoing commitments.
From a strictly geopolitical perspective, though, the Indo-Pacific is crucial to the survival of Asian states. It is less central to the United States.
Energy flows, maritime trade routes, and industrial supply chains bind the region together.
But those same dependencies also generate tensions among regional powers.
A secure continental republic must hence be cautious about transforming regional geopolitical rivalries into permanent American strategic obligations.
Strategic Inertia and Elite Assumptions
One of the most powerful forces in strategy is institutional inertia.
Strategic establishments often preserve the frameworks that shaped their careers, budgets, and intellectual assumptions.
For several generations, American strategic elites have operated within a world defined by global leadership and maritime dominance.
As a result, many policymakers instinctively assume that the United States must continue managing the global system indefinitely.
Yet the strategic record of the post-Cold War era deserves scrutiny.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has pursued a strategy aimed at sustaining global primacy. It also focuses on managing regional security systems across multiple theatres.
The results have been mixed.
Major interventions in the Middle East produced prolonged instability rather than durable political outcomes.
Attempts to reshape regional orders through military power generated strategic fatigue at home.
Meanwhile, expanding global commitments occurred alongside growing domestic polarization and declining public confidence in national institutions.
These outcomes do not necessarily imply failure.
But they do raise an important strategic question.
The strategic frameworks developed during the unipolar moment have produced limited success over three decades. It may be prudent to reconsider the assumptions that sustain them.
Strategy ultimately must be judged not by its intentions but by its results.
A Republic-First Strategy
If the United States is entering the systemic crisis, strategic priorities will change. William Strauss and Neil Howe described this as a Fourth Turning. They will inevitably shift. This shift in strategy becomes necessary during such crises.
During such periods, the central aim becomes preserving the republic’s political cohesion.
External commitments must thus be evaluated through a different lens.
Not:
“How do we sustain the existing international order?”
But rather:
“What strategy best preserves the constitutional republic?”
Foreign policy must reinforce domestic legitimacy rather than undermine it.
The First Turning Ahead
The current era signifies the winter phase of a Fourth Turning. After this, the next phase of history will focus on rebuilding political legitimacy. It will also aim to restore institutional stability.
The success of that renewal will depend less on global military posture. It will depend more on the strength of the society that sustains the republic.
Great powers ultimately derive their strength from the societies behind them.
For a constitutional republic, the citizen remains the ultimate strategic foundation.
No alliance, fleet, or trade route can substitute for that.
Question for Strategists
If the citizen is the true centre of gravity of a constitutional republic, we must evaluate foreign commitments carefully. Which ones strengthen that foundation? Which ones weaken it?
Author
Tom Raquer
Lt. Col. (Ret.), USAF
Former Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer.
Writer on geopolitics, strategy, and generational cycles. Author of the Substack series After the Winter — Collapse, Spring, and the New First Turning. The series examines strategy during periods of systemic crisis.
Selected Sources
The Fourth Turning — William Strauss & Neil Howe
The Revenge of Geography — Robert D. Kaplan
U.S. Energy Information Administration — global energy flow data
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