UNDER THE SPELL OF “ELITE WOODEN-HEADEDNESS; SELF-DELUSION; THE RAISON D’ÉTAT FOR ONE WAR FOLLY AFTER ANOTHER!

It is disturbingto realize that our endless wars were never justified, never fought to defend our national security, and that they should have ever been fought at all. Afghanistan stands as a stark example, revealing that our military blunders arise not from genuine national security interests but from entrenched delusion, self-deception. The late historian Barbara Tuchman aptly described this disorder as “wooden-headedness.” 1 This mindset reflects what our analysts wish the strategic environment to be rather than confronting the harsh realities we face.

The Absurdity of Endless Wars

Let’s be clear: all our post-Cold War wars and engagements, including those with China, do not serve the national interest. Instead, they are misguided offspring of wooden-headedness that has taken root in the minds of our leaders, who constantly claim they are defending our national security. They assure us we are “winning,” all while insisting that the war in Afghanistan must continue indefinitely. They proclaim, “We had to fight them over there so we would not have to fight them here.” What a troubling delusion! The Taliban, impoverished and largely disconnected from the modern world, would not even have the means to come to America, let alone find it on a map. Nevertheless, our leaders seem unable to recognize the absurdity of this belief.

This self-delusion has fueled reckless incursions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, echoing the senselessness we witnessed in Vietnam. History is trying to tell us something, yet here we are, repeating catastrophic mistakes that have ruined countless lives.

Lessons Ignored

We must confront the reality of our wooden-headedness. It is not merely about needing more time, resources, or better strategies; we had all that in abundance. The hard truth is that we cling to the dangerous illusion that we can reshape other civilizations to reflect our values. We must acknowledge this bitter reality—they do not want to become us! It is time to stop imposing our ideals on cultures that are disinterested in adopting them.

If we continue down this path of self-delusion, we will lay the groundwork for future failures. Engaging in genuine dialogue and recognizing the consequences of our actions on the global stage is imperative. Our foreign policy and the nation’s future depend on our willingness to abandon this dangerous mindset.

Grasping Wooden-Headedness

Fernand Braudel warned that conquered nations might submit to the stronger, but such submission is temporary when civilizations collide. 3 Tuchman’s concept of “wooden-headedness” reflects the self-deception that flourishes in our government—clinging to rigid ideas while disregarding contradictory evidence. This pattern is evident in our post-Cold War wars and misguided engagement strategies.

As we sift through the wreckage of past conflicts, we must heed Braudel’s warning. No matter how powerful our military is, we cannot impose our ideals on other nations. Just look at Japan and Germany—they have maintained their identities through war and peace. Do we believe that shifting geopolitical realities will prevent Germany from pursuing expansion or Japan from chasing vital resources? Attempting to reshape sovereign nations is sheer folly, as evidenced by our hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan—a disaster we should have anticipated.

The Consequences of Misguided Policies

Sadly, the American public is often sidelined in discussions about our war policies. We have been misled, grappling with the chaos orchestrated by elite policymakers. Understanding why we failed in Afghanistan is crucial; it lays bare the blunders that permeate our post-Cold War engagements in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the ongoing proxy war in Ukraine.

Let us be clear: uncovering the truth about this lost war is non-negotiable. This is not merely about resources or troop effectiveness; it is a mindset entrenched in our policymakers’ thinking that predates our military follies. This damaging mentality continues to drain our resources while emboldening our enemies. Tuchman’s concept of “wooden-headedness” captures this self-deception that often leads us into conflict and perpetuates wars doomed to failure.

We must confront and eradicate this mindset—it is nothing less than a national emergency! If we do not tackle these issues head-on, we set ourselves up to relive the same mistakes and incur the steep costs that have entangled us in a Ukrainian proxy war with Russia. How did we embark on this misguided mission? It is time to scrutinize the flawed assumptions that have guided our military actions and hold accountable those who perpetuate this cycle of failure.

Under the Spell of Wooden-Headedness

Let us not mince words: Lt gen. (Ret.) Karl Eikenberry embodies the troubling delusion surrounding our involvement in Afghanistan. From 2002 to 2003, he focused on building Afghan police and military forces, even claiming he had earned the moniker of “Father of the Afghan National Army.” 4 Despite his confidence, the disastrous withdrawal in 2021 revealed a stark truth: We had neither an effective Afghan government nor a competent Afghan Army.

NATO Commander James Stavridis painted a rosy picture in 2012, boasting about cooperation between coalition forces and Afghan security. However, his reflections in 2021 starkly denounced a collective blindness to Afghanistan’s history, culture, and the nature of insurgency warfare. Did it take us two decades to grasp these critical failures? Or was it entrenched wooden-headedness leading us to this monumental folly? Did our arrogance blind us to the complexities of waging war in Afghanistan?

Consider Stanley McChrystal, who once declared, “We have got a government in a box, ready to roll in.” ^5 Did he truly believe we could impose a government as swiftly as deploying troops? It is staggering! In February 2013, outgoing U.S. and NATO commander Marine Gen. John Allen proclaimed that Afghan forces were ready to take the reins, declaring, “This is victory. This is what winning looks like.” ^6 Seriously? Other generals echoed this misguided bravado. Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Allen’s successor, confidently claimed, “I talk a lot about winning these days, and I firmly believe we are on a path to winning.” ^7 His deputy, Army Lt. Gen. Mark Milley, assured Afghan troops, “You will win this war, and we will be there with you every step of the way.” ^8 Milley later proclaimed they were “on the road to victory, on the road to winning, on the road to creating a stable Afghanistan!” ^9

Accountability and Action

Let us cut to the chase: During his congressional testimony on October 5, 2021, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) H.R. McMaster exposed the Afghanistan war’s roots in wooden-headedness. His urgent warnings about what we must avoid are classic “Johnny-come-lately” analyses. However, these uncomfortable truths should have been evident long before we set foot on that foreign soil. It is high time we demanded accountability and shed the wooden-headedness afflicting our warmakers.

McMaster stated, “We must stop pretending that we can end endless wars by simply withdrawing.” ^10 Sure, we have done it before—look at Vietnam! Why did we engage in conflicts with no true interests or chances of victory? These essential questions should have been asked long before we plunged into war!

Moreover, we must stop pretending that vilification from the “international community” will influence the Taliban. Seriously, who is buying this nonsense? It did not change Russia’s behavior, nor did it alter the stance of the so-called international community. Let us be clear—the vilification only distracts us from harsh realities.

He continues, “We must stop pretending that the military instrument can be separated from diplomacy.” ^11 How often have our military actions undermined our political and diplomatic efforts? We must break this vicious cycle, yet we plunge ahead without learning from history!

Finally, we must stop pretending that it is acceptable to wage wars without a genuine commitment to victory. Winning is not just a buzzword; it means ensuring that places like Afghanistan never again serve as havens for jihadist terrorists.

So, does this mean we need to stay in this tribal land indefinitely to prevent jihadists from establishing camps in a region riddled with porous borders? That is the stark reality we must confront. While McMaster’s assertions may ring true now, they highlight our failure to recognize these truths before we waded into conflict. We must confront these questions candidly and take responsibility for our choices rather than hiding behind empty rhetoric and late realizations.

In Conclusion

The narrative surrounding U.S. involvement in Afghanistan exposes layers of delusional thinking among military and political leaders. It starkly reflects overconfidence, misunderstandings of local dynamics, and a tendency to rationalize failure—all contributing to a misguided approach that led us to disaster. Recognizing these delusions is imperative for understanding the complexities of foreign intervention and the risks of imposing external solutions on entrenched societal issues.

This is not just some intellectual exercise; the stakes are genuine. Our decisions impact the lives of our servicemen and women and the stability of entire nations. It is high time we rise to this challenge and engage in the difficult conversations we have thus far avoided. The future of our republic hinges on it.

Call to Action

Let us demand an open national debate on our wars, starting with Afghanistan as a symbolic beginning. We must hold our leaders accountable and confront the truths we have long neglected.

References

1. Tuchman, Barbara. The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam. Knopf, 1984.
2. This is a paraphrase from various assertions made by military leaders regarding the state of conflict.
3. Braudel, Fernand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. Harper & Row, 1972.
4. Eikenberry, Karl. “The Afghanistan Puzzle: A Perspective from the Field.” The National Interest, July/August 2011.
5. McChrystal, Stanley A. My Share of the Task: A Memoir. Penguin Press, 2013.
6. Allen, John R. “Testimony on Afghanistan,” U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 2013.
7. Dunford, Joseph F. “Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” 2015.
8. Milley, Mark. “Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee,” 2019.
9. This paraphrases Milley’s statements as reported during various military briefings.
10. McMaster, H.R. Congressional Testimony, October 5, 2021.
11. Ibid.

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