The Indo-Pacific Delusion

Why Energy, Sea Power, and Geography Still Decide Asia’s Future

Tom Raquer

Lt. Col. (Ret.), USAF • Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer

Independent Consultant — Indo-Pacific Geopolitics, Maritime Strategy, and Energy Security

From the series:

After the Winter — Collapse, Spring, and the New First Turning

Published: March 16, 2026

The Indo-Pacific economy depends on energy flowing thousands of miles across maritime chokepoints. These have been protected for decades by American sea power. Yet, in a returning geopolitical world, the United States may have little reason to sustain that system.

The industrial economies of East Asia rely on energy that travels thousands of miles. This energy crosses some of the world’s most vulnerable maritime chokepoints.

Oil and liquefied natural gas originating in the Persian Gulf move through a chain of sea lanes. These extend from the Strait of Hormuz across the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of Malacca. Finally, they reach the industrial economies of East Asia.

The modern Indo-Pacific system, thus, rests on a vast maritime energy corridor linking the Middle East to Asia.

For nearly eight decades, these routes have stayed secure. This is largely because the United States Navy guaranteed the openness of global sea lanes.

Yet recent events in the Middle East reveal a deeper reality.

If globalisation weakens and geopolitics returns, this may impact the Indo-Pacific system. The strategic foundations there could prove far more fragile than many American strategists assume.

Key Points

• Indo-Pacific strategy was built during the era of globalisation and assumes stable maritime trade and uninterrupted energy flows.

• The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz exposes a structural vulnerability in that system.

• Much of the energy sustaining East Asian industrial economies originates outside the Indo-Pacific and travels through fragile maritime chokepoints.

• Since 1945, the United States Navy has effectively guaranteed the security of global sea lanes as a maritime public good.

• In a geopolitical and mercantile world, the United States may have far less incentive to sustain that system. This is because it’s primarily for the benefit of other industrial economies.

• The Indo-Pacific is often treated as a unified strategic bloc. Yet, the region holds diverse civilisations, political systems, and geopolitical interests.

• The failure of the Domino Theory after Vietnam demonstrated the limits of simplified regional strategic models.

Strategic Context

American strategy today assumes that the international system created after 1945 will continue to operate. It is expected to run much as it has over the past generation.

The Indo-Pacific framework rests on the belief that globalisation will endure.

But the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz suggests the system itself may be fracturing.

For decades, the uninterrupted flow of energy through Hormuz was treated as a permanent feature of the global economy.

It is not.

When that chokepoint is threatened or closed, the underlying geopolitical structure of the world economy becomes visible again.

A Strategy Built on Globalisation

The Indo-Pacific concept emerged during a period when globalisation appeared durable.

Supply chains were global.

Energy markets were integrated.

Maritime trade moved across oceans with minimal disruption.

Under these conditions, maintaining the balance of power in the Western Pacific appeared central to global stability.

Coalition building among maritime democracies became the organising principle of American strategy.

Yet this framework rests on a deeper assumption:

that the globalised system itself will continue functioning.

Hormuz and the Fragility of the System

The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz reveals how fragile that assumption may be.

Nearly a fifth of global oil trade passes through this single chokepoint.

Energy markets react instantly.

Supply chains destabilise.

Governments confront economic pressure.

The crisis reveals something globalisation temporarily obscured.

The global economy still depends on geography.

And geography can’t be engineered away.

The Return of the Mercantile World

When globalisation weakens, states change their behaviour.

Governments begin prioritising:

• industrial capacity

• supply chain resilience

• energy security

• domestic stability

Trade does not disappear.

But it becomes strategic rather than purely economic.

Economic policy once again becomes an instrument of national power.

Energy and the Hidden Assumption of Indo-Pacific Strategy

East Asia remains heavily dependent on imported energy.

Japan imports roughly 90 per cent of its oil from the Middle East.

Much of this energy travels along a predictable maritime path:

Persian Gulf → Strait of Hormuz → Indian Ocean → Strait of Malacca → East Asia

The Indo-Pacific system, hence, depends on energy resources sourced outside the region.

The industrial economies of East Asia ultimately rely on maritime corridors stretching thousands of miles beyond the Western Pacific.

The Indian Ocean Reality

Much discussion of Indo-Pacific strategy focuses on flashpoints in the Western Pacific, particularly the Taiwan Strait.

Yet the energy flows sustaining the industrial economies of East Asia originate largely outside that region.

The maritime routes link the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. They also connect to the Strait of Malacca. These routes form the logistical backbone of the Indo-Pacific system.

More than a century ago, the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that control of maritime trade routes is crucial. He believed strategic chokepoints ultimately shape the balance of power among nations.

The modern global energy system has only reinforced this reality.

The Maritime Public Good

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States Navy has effectively guaranteed global maritime trade.

Energy shipments moved freely.

Allies benefited.

Neutral states benefited.

Even strategic competitors benefited.

But this arrangement rested on a strategic decision made in Washington.

Strategic decisions can change.

In a more openly geopolitical and mercantile world, the incentives shaping American strategy may shift dramatically.

The United States now imports only a small share of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Much of the energy passing through that corridor flows instead to Japan, South Korea, India, and China.

Under such conditions, it may no longer serve American interests to guarantee the openness of the Indo-Pacific maritime system. This guarantee should not be primarily for the advantage of other industrial economies.

A Question for Strategists

The Indo-Pacific system depends on energy flows protected by American sea power. The international system is becoming more geopolitical and mercantile. Should the United States continue guaranteeing that system primarily for the advantage of other industrial economies?

Republic-First Strategy in a Crisis Era

Strategists since Carl von Clausewitz have emphasised the importance of identifying a nation’s true centre of gravity.

In a constitutional republic, the centre of gravity ultimately rests in the political cohesion of the society. It relies on the economic resilience of the society. It also depends on the civic legitimacy of the society. It does not rely on military forces or overseas commitments.

A Fourth Turning crisis places extraordinary pressure on those internal foundations.

In such moments, the central task of strategy is not preserving an international system designed for another era.

It is ensuring that the republic itself emerges from the crisis intact.

Doctrine

The first duty of American strategy is not to preserve the global order.

It is preserving the American republic.

Final Thought

Globalisation suspended geopolitics for a generation.

But geography, energy, and industrial power never disappeared. They were merely obscured by an unusually stable maritime order sustained by American sea power.

If that maritime order weakens, the Indo-Pacific will again operate according to the traditional logic of geopolitics.

In such a world, the central task of American strategy will be to guarantee something significant. The American republic must stay the true centre of gravity.

Sources

Alfred Thayer Mahan — The Influence of Sea Power upon History

Halford Mackinder — Democratic Ideals and Reality

Nicholas Spykman — America’s Strategy in World Politics

Carl von Clausewitz — On War

George Kennan — Containment strategy

William Strauss & Neil Howe — The Fourth Turning

About the Author

Tom Raquer is a retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer.

During his career, he served in Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and Timor-Leste. He spent more than seven years at U.S. Pacific Command working on Southeast Asian political-military affairs.

He now works as an independent consultant and analyst on Indo-Pacific geopolitics, maritime strategy, and energy security.

His series After the Winter — Collapse, Spring, and the New First Turning explores systemic crises. These crises reshape international order. They also influence the strategic priorities of constitutional republics.